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Abstract. The piggy bank idea allows one-way encryption of information that can be accessed 
only by authorized parties. Here we show how the piggy bank idea can be used to authenticate 
parties to counter man-in-the-middle (MIM) attack that can jeopardize the double-lock 
cryptography protocol.  We call this method double-signature double lock cryptography and it 
can be implemented in ways that go beyond hash-based message authentication. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A secret can be easily inserted in the locked and sealed piggy-bank but it cannot be withdrawn 
without opening the box.  In the cryptographic applications of this idea, a signed letter that lists 
and certifies the contents of the box is sent together with the sealed piggy-bank [1].  We show 
how the idea of the piggy bank can strengthen the double-lock (DL) cryptography that is behind 
methods such as the Diffie-Hellmann key exchange [2] and the three-stage quantum 
cryptography protocol [3].  
 
The basic DL protocol does not address the question of authentication of the two parties and, 
therefore, this scheme suffers from the man-in-the-middle (MIM) attack. The timing information 
can be used to detect the MIM attack. The MIM attack is easier to deal with in communications 
systems where there are no latencies in the transmission as compared to the case of computer 
networks where the attack can be facilitated by DNS spoofing. In computer networks, the 
forensics related to an MIM attack include time-to-live (TTL) count of the IP packets, round-trip 
time between the client and the server which can be estimated by measuring the time from when 
the client sends its initial TCP SYN packet to when it receives a TCP SYN+ACK from the 
server. A low number of router hops as well as fast response time will be an indicator of an IP 
MIM attack. 
 
In this note basic issues associated with the MIM attack are examined, The piggy bank approach 
provides a means of authentication of the contents in a computer network and thereby it provides 
protection against such attack.  
 
2. THE BASIC DOUBLE-LOCK SCHEME AND THE MIM ATTACK 
To consider the basic DL scheme imagine Alice wishes to send a secret gift, S, to Bob via an 
untrustworthy courier.  We assume that both Alice and Bob have access to unbreakable boxes, 
locks and keys. Alice places the gift within such a box and sends it to Bob after locking it with 
her key A.  Bob adds his own lock to the box and sends it back to Alice. Alice unlocks her lock 
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and sends it back to Bob who can then unlock it and receive the gift meant for him. The locks of 
Alice and Bob are labeled A and B. 
 
 
       
Figure 1. The MIM attack by Eve 
In the MIM attack, Eve, in collusion with the courier, interposes herself between Alice and Bob, 
telling Alice that she is Bob and telling Bob that she is Alice (Figure 1).  When she receives the 
box sent by Alice, she puts her own unbreakable lock, E, on the Box and sends it back to Alice 
who innocently assumes that it came from Bob. She unlocks her lock and sends the box to Eve 
who is able to open it and get the gift S. Meanwhile, she has also sent a fake gift, F, to Bob in 
another box which she locks with her lock and has the courier take it to Bob with the word that it 
has come from Alice. Bob puts his lock on it, sends it to Eve who unlocks her lock and sends it 
back to Bob, who now receives F. 
 
                              
                    Figure 2. Normal operation of the DL protocol 
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Since in a single consideration of the application of DL Bob does not get what Alice sent him, 
there are ways for the two parties to know that the true gift did not arrive at the destination by 
means of a separate communication. In the case of data, the two parties could compare the hash 
digests of the sent and the received message. 
 
When we consider the repeated use of the MIM attack on messages (rather than gifts) from Alice 
to Bob, we see that Eve can send Alice’s messages to Bob (and vice versa) just one step behind 
(Figure 3).  
 
 
  Figure 3. MIM with timing information 
 
Therefore, any signature appended by Alice to the message will be forwarded by Eve to Bob. 
However, if each of the operations came with spoof-proof time-stamps, the action of Eve will 
become transparent. 
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3.  TIMING INFORMATION 
One way to counter the MIM attack is to use the timing information associated with the data, if 
such information is available. In the normal functioning of the protocol as in Figure 2, the data 
leaves Alice at time tA(1)=0 and reaches her back at tA(2)==4. Let this time between two 
consecutive exchanges for Alice be called TA, which has a value of 4. The corresponding times 
for Bob are tB(1)=2, and tB(2)=6, and thus TB= 4. In the case of MIM attack as in Figure 3, the 
timings are: 
 
 Alice: 0 and 2 
 Bob:  4 and 6 
 
Thus TA(MIM) = TB(MIM)  = 2, whereas TA(normal) = TB(normal)  = 4. 
 
Obviously the difference is due to the fact that the distances between Alice and Eve as well as 
Eve and Bob are less than between Alice and Bob. Here we assume that Eve is midway between 
Alice and Bob. If that is not the case then there would be additional asymmetry between the total 
times for Alice and Bob. For example if Eve is as far away from both Alice and Bob as they are 
from each other, the total time in the DL protocol would be doubled and this can also  be a sign 
of the attack. 
 
The timing information in the normal case and in the MIM attack is represented in Figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Figure 4. Timing information (for Eve situated in the middle) 
 
The means of the two times for Alice and Bob in the normal mode are 2 and 4, respectively; in 
other words, the mean time for Bob is twice the mean time for Alice. In the case of the MIM 
attack, the means are 1 and 5, respectively, or the ratio of the two means has increased to 5. 
Additionally, the time between the two communications for both Alice and Bob has gone down 
from the original 4 units to the lower 2 units.  
 
Alice Bob Alice Bob 
2 4 6 0 
1 2 3 4 5 6 0 
Eve Bob Eve  Alice Alice Eve Bob 
Normal Mode 
MIM Attack 
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Both these pieces of information can be used to determine if an MIM attack has taken place. The 
use of the first of these pieces of information requires a comparison between the values for Alice 
and Bob and, therefore, a secure exchange that is not accessible to Eve. The second piece of 
information can be processed by each of these parties separately. 
 
The DL protocol requires a handshake protocol prior to the transformations of Figure 2 for 
authentication so that the timing comparisons can be made. We propose the use of the piggy 
bank idea in exchange of the relevant timing information. 
 
4. THE PIGGY BANK TROPE 
In the piggy bank system, the box and the contents authenticate the parties.  Bob sends an 
empty locked, unbreakable piggy bank to Alice who, when she receives it, deposits the secret 
(money, bills, and jewels) into the box together with the decryption key of a signed letter. In 
addition, she prepares a letter to be sent separately. The piggy bank and the letter are sent 
back to Bob. The letter is required to authenticate the contents of the locked piggy bank box. It 
cannot be in plaintext because the content list itself is a secret. The letter is needed to establish 
the identity of the person who has sent the secret (that is Alice) and this may carry an additional 
secret. The letter may be sent within the box if there is certainty that it cannot be taken out by 
the untrustworthy courier. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The piggy bank cryptographic trope; the secret letter is represented by 
 
Bob opens the box, obtains the secret, and also reads the signed letter which has further details 
of the secrets in it. This method is described greater detail in [1] and summarized in Figure 5. 
 
As shown in Figure 5, the box authenticates Bob and Alice is authenticated by the signed letter 
and this provides a manner of linking the message to the specific communication that was 
lacking in the DL protocol. We have deliberately not specified the form of the letter for this can 
be done in a variety of ways depending on the application in mind. In particular, one can 
imagine a special kind of “letter” in which some identification of the secret is added to the 
signature of Alice. When Bob obtains the secret, he can compute the identification sequence and 
then use it to determine the signature of Alice and compare it to the one on file. 
Bob 
Alice 
S 
S, K 
K 
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In continuing communication, the initial authentication secures the first exchange. This, in turn, 
can be linked to the security of the second message, and so on. The idea of linkages of messages 
has been used in the past in a variety of situations. A method of authentication when messages 
are exchanged is described in [4]. An interesting method was devised to deal with the possibility 
of dishonest postal employees stealing letters containing currency notes over a hundred years 
ago in Kashmir in which a unique operation performed on the notes authenticates the contents 
(for the milieu of that age, see [5]).  According to my father, his father would first cut currency 
notes in half, and send one set of halves in a sealed registered letter through the post office. Only 
after he had received confirmation that the letter had arrived safely would he send another letter 
with the missing halves in another registered cover. Once both sets had arrived, the notes would 
be spliced together and presented to the bank to be replaced (which was required by law to 
accept damaged or spliced currency notes as long as the serial number was legible). The risk 
taken by my grandfather was that the dishonest employee would simply destroy the contents of 
the pilfered cover, but he reasoned that while some employees might be dishonest they were not 
likely to be malicious.  
 
To go back to the question of the MIM attack on the DL protocol, observe that initially neither 
Alice nor Bob have side information available for authenticating each other. The idea of using 
only half the information cannot be used since for Alice and Bob, Eve is invisible and received 
data (which has only been read and not altered) will pass all tests of authentication. 
 
We now consider a variation of the DL scheme in which the idea of an accompanying coded 
number provides initial authentication (of course, other schemes of authentication [6] can also be 
used). And since it is based on the piggy bank trope we call this method Double Signature 
Double Lock Tropocol (from trope).  
5. THE DOUBLE-SIGNATURE DOUBLE-LOCK TROPOCOL (DDT) 
In the normal operation of DDT, as shown in Figure 6, Alice and Bob share a random number R, 
distributed to them by an Authenticating Authority at the end of an initial handshake.   
Alice sends A(S) together with the hash of R+A(S). After receiving A(S), Bob can confirm that 
Alice is in possession of R, which authenticates Alice to Bob. In his turn, Bob adds his signature 
which is the hash digest of R and BA(S) and sends it together with BA(S) back to Alice. Alice 
can compute her own digest and confirm that what she has received is correct, thereby 
authenticating Bob. (If Alice’s own signature doesn’t match Bob’s she terminates the 
communication, and likewise for Bob at the end of the first pass.) This double signature makes it 
impossible for Eve to mount the MIM attack since she doesn’t possess R.  
The reason why Alice and Bob compute the hash of R+A(S) as well as R+BA(S) is to prevent 
replay attack. 
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Figure 6. Normal operation of DDT  
DDT can be strengthened by the use of additional timing information. Alice and Bob can 
introduce random delays in their processing of incoming data. Assuming there are no other 
delays beyond the travel time of the messages, both Alice and Bob can use delays that represent 
binary random sequences. Furthermore, if the sequences used by Alice and Bob are orthogonal 
or near-orthogonal (e.g. [7]-[9]) (and this can be assured by the initial handshake), they can each 
compute the autocorrelation of the delay process to confirm that the data that is being received 
indeed came from them in an earlier pass.  
The double-signature can also be performed implicitly. Alice can send S1+R in the first 
exchange, S2+S1 in the second exchange and so on. Without the knowledge of R, the reading of 
the messages will not be useful to Eve although she could mount other cryptographic attacks on 
the intercepted data. But in an augmented security system where the timing information is also 
being used, such data will in any way be denied to Eve. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
The piggy bank idea, which allows one-way encryption of information that can be accessed only 
by authorized parties, has been employed to authenticate parties to counter man-in-the-middle 
(MIM) attack.  In some versions, this may be considered a special case of security enhancement 
using hash-based message authentication code; in other versions, such as implicit security, the 
implementation does not require the use of hashing. 
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